Moral hazard and agency relationship in sequential litigation
Year of publication: |
March 2015
|
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Authors: | At, Christian ; Gabuthy, Yannick |
Published in: |
International review of law and economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0144-8188, ZDB-ID 704902-X. - Vol. 41.2015, p. 86-90
|
Subject: | Sequential trials | Moral hazard | Theorie | Theory | Moral Hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Zivilprozess | Civil litigation | Rechtsökonomik | Economic analysis of law |
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