Moral hazard and renegotiation in multi-agent incentive contracts when each agent makes a renegotiation offer
Year of publication: |
1998
|
---|---|
Authors: | Osano, Hiroshi |
Published in: |
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. - Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681. - Vol. 37.1998, 2, p. 207-230
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Involuntary Unemployment and the Threat to Shirking Workers
Osano, Hiroshi, (1988)
-
Real Business Cycles in a Dynamic Labor Contract Equilibrium
Osano, Hiroshi, (1988)
-
Coordination Failure and Long Run Growth
Osano, Hiroshi, (1989)
- More ...