Moral Hazard and Renegotiation of Multi-Signal Contracts
Year of publication: |
2012
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bijapur, Mohan |
Publisher: |
[2012]: [S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Vertrag | Contract | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (31 p) |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 25, 2011 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.1872529 [DOI] |
Classification: | D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
-
Deterministic versus stochastic contracts in a dynamic principal-agent model
Mettral, Thomas, (2018)
-
Optimal Contracts for Lenient Supervisors
Giebe, Thomas, (2011)
-
Delegation with incomplete and renegotiable contracts
Gerratana, Emanuele, (2008)
- More ...
-
Do Asset Regulations Impede Portfolio Diversification? Evidence from European Life Insurance Funds
Bijapur, Mohan, (2012)
-
Do financial crises erode potential output? evidence from OECD inflation responses
Bijapur, Mohan, (2012)
-
Do asset regulations impede portfolio diversification? evidence from European life insurance funds
Bijapur, Mohan, (2012)
- More ...