Moral-hazard credit cycles with risk-averse agents
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Myerson, Roger B. |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 153.2014, p. 74-102
|
Subject: | Moral hazard | Credit cycles | Theorie | Theory | Moral Hazard | Konjunktur | Business cycle | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Kreditmarkt | Credit market | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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