Moral Hazard in Corporate Investment and the Disciplinary Role of Voluntary Capital Rationing
Year of publication: |
1997
|
---|---|
Authors: | Zhang, Guochang |
Published in: |
Management Science. - Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences - INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909. - Vol. 43.1997, 6, p. 737-750
|
Publisher: |
Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences - INFORMS |
Subject: | capital rationing | principal-agent | high hurdle rate | NPV | renegotiation-proof |
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