Moral hazard in marriage : the use of domestic labor as an incentive device
Year of publication: |
June 2017
|
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Authors: | Walther, Selma |
Published in: |
Review of Economics of the Household. - Norwell, Mass. : Springer Science + Business Media B.V., ISSN 1569-5239, ZDB-ID 2108192-X. - Vol. 15.2017, 2, p. 357-382
|
Subject: | Moral hazard | Divorce | Domestic labor | Matrilineal | Moral Hazard | Theorie | Theory | Ehe | Marriage | Anreiz | Incentives | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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