Moral Hazard, Land Fertility and Sharecropping in a Rural Area of the Philippines.

Introducing concerns about land fertility for the landlords in a Principal-Agent model of sharecropping with moral hazard, the authors show that the optimal contract under limited commitment reflects a trade-off between production and land quality maintenance. Using Philippines data, a model where the leasing out and contract choices are simultaneous is estimated and avoids the selectivity bias of observed contracts.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Dubois, P.
Subject:	MORAL HAZARD \| LAND ECONOMICS \| RURAL DEVELOPMENT

Check Google Scholar |

More access options

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	42 pages
Classification:	D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Q12 - Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets ; Q15 - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation ; Q24 - Land
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005671488