Moral Hazard, Mergers, and Market Power
Year of publication: |
2001
|
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Authors: | Wickelgren, Abraham L. |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Marktmacht | Market power | Fusion | Merger | Preiswettbewerb | Price competition | Mehrproduktfertigung | Multiproduct production |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (34 p) |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.287058 [DOI] |
Classification: | D20 - Production and Organizations. General ; L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration ; L40 - Antitrust Policy. General |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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