MORAL HAZARD, RISK AVERSION AND EFFICIENCY

type="main"> <title type="main">ABSTRACT</title> <p>This note revisits the classic moral-hazard model, but assumes that the output distribution has moving support and punishments are limited. The results show that the principal can implement an efficient solution if the agent is sufficiently risk averse.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Gürtler, Oliver
Published in:	Bulletin of Economic Research. - Wiley Blackwell. - Vol. 66.2014, S1, p. 104-104
Publisher:	Wiley Blackwell

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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