Moral Hazard Severity and Contract Design
Year of publication: |
2005
|
---|---|
Authors: | Dye, Ronald A. ; Sridhar, Sri S. |
Published in: |
RAND Journal of Economics. - The RAND Corporation, ISSN 0741-6261. - Vol. 36.2005, 1, p. 78-92
|
Publisher: |
The RAND Corporation |
Subject: | Asymmetric and Private Information Economics of Contract: Theory Agency | Contracts | Hazard | Moral Hazard |
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