Motivate and select : relational contracts with persistent types
Year of publication: |
2017
|
---|---|
Authors: | Nikolowa, Radoslawa |
Published in: |
Journal of economics & management strategy : JEMS. - Malden, Mass. [u.a.] : Blackwell, ISSN 1058-6407, ZDB-ID 1123863-X. - Vol. 26.2017, 3, p. 624-635
|
Subject: | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Arbeitsmarkttheorie | Labour market theory |
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