Multi-agent contracting with countervailing incentives and limited liability
Year of publication: |
2009-09
|
---|---|
Authors: | Danau, Daniel ; Vinella, Annalisa |
Institutions: | Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm (CRIEFF), University of St. Andrews |
Subject: | Countervailing incentives | Limited liability | Correlation | Pooling |
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