Multi-candidate equilibria
We demonstrate the existence of an electoral equilibrium in a model with three or more candidates. We use the same kinds of assumptions that have previously been used to establish existence in two-candidate models and have not had to make special assumptions regarding dimensionality (e.g., that there is only one dimension) or distribution of voter preferences (e.g., symmetry). Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1984
Year of publication: |
1984
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Authors: | Wittman, Donald |
Published in: |
Public Choice. - Springer. - Vol. 43.1984, 3, p. 287-291
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Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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