Multi-level evolution in games
In this paper, we analyze a generalization of the evolutionary model of Kandori, Mailath, & Rob (1991) where the population is partitioned into disjoint groups and evolution takes place "in parallel" at the following two levels: (i) within groups, at the lower level; among groups, at the higher one. Unlike in their context, efficiency considerations always overcome those of risk-dominance in the process of selecting the long-ron equilibrium in large populations. From a normative viewpoint, this suggests the potential importance of "decentralization", here understood as local and independent interaction.
Year of publication: |
1992-12
|
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Authors: | Redondo, Fernando Vega ; Cerdá, José Canals |
Institutions: | Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) |
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