A multiagent game theoretical approach to adverse selection in corporate financing : reducing asymmetric information in Mudaraba contracts by developing adverse selection indices
Year of publication: |
2016
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Authors: | El Fakir, Adil ; Tkiouat, Mohamed |
Published in: |
Investment management and financial innovations. - Sumy : Publishing Company "Business Perspectives", ISSN 1810-4967, ZDB-ID 2467221-X. - Vol. 13.2016, 2, p. 292-299
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Subject: | Mudaraba | perfect cross subsidization | market breakdown | relative daverse selection | due diligence | adverse selection | Islamic venture capitalist | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Risikokapital | Venture capital |
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