Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Mishra, Debasis ; Pramanik, Anup ; Roy, Souvik |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 153.2014, p. 103-116
|
Subject: | Implementation | 2-cycle monotonicity | Revenue equivalence | Single-peakedness | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game |
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