Multimarket contact in continuous-time games
This paper investigates whether multimarket contact is effective in increasing the value of collusion. We show that for any discount rate, the set of equilibrium payoffs (average per market) expands through multimarket contact in continuous-time games.
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Kobayashi, Hajime ; Ohta, Katsunori |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 101.2008, 1, p. 4-5
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | C72 C73 L13 Multimarket contact Continuous-time games |
Saved in:
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