Multiple directorships and the performance of mergers & acquisitions
Year of publication: |
July 2015
|
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Authors: | Chen, Li-Yu ; Lai, Jung-Ho ; Chen, Carl R. |
Published in: |
The North American journal of economics and finance : a journal of financial economics studies. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1062-9408, ZDB-ID 1289278-6. - Vol. 33.2015, p. 178-198
|
Subject: | Multiple directorships | Corporate governance | Mergers and acquisitions | Übernahme | Takeover | Corporate Governance | Fusion | Merger | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Unternehmenserfolg | Firm performance | Vorstand | Executive board |
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