Multiple equilibria in the citizen-candidate model of representative democracy
Year of publication: |
2002
|
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Authors: | Dhillon, Amrita ; Lockwood, Ben |
Published in: |
Journal of public economic theory. - Malden, Mass. : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 1097-3923, ZDB-ID 1468434-2. - Vol. 4.2002, 2, p. 171-184
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Subject: | Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie | Economic theory of democracy | Dynamisches Spiel | Dynamic game | Theorie | Theory | Gleichgewichtsmodell | Equilibrium model |
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