Multiplicative uncertainty, central bank transparency and optimal degree of conservativeness

This paper extends the results of Kobayashi (2003) and Ciccarone and Marchetti (2009) by considering the optimal choice of central bank conservativeness. It is shown that the government can choose a sufficiently populist but opaque central banker so that higher multiplicative uncertainty improves the social welfare only when the society is very conservative.

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Year of publication:	2010-06
Authors:	Dai, Meixing
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	Multiplicative uncertainty \| optimal degree of conservativeness \| Brainard conservatism \| central bank transparency

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	MPRA Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in Economics Bulletin no.3.Vol. 3(2010): pp. 1720-1726
Classification:	E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies ; E52 - Monetary Policy (Targets, Instruments, and Effects)
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008835356