Multitask principal-agent problems : optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation
Year of publication: |
2009
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bond, Philip ; Gomes, Armando R. |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 144.2009, 1, p. 175-211
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Nutzenfunktion | Utility function | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency | Theorie | Theory |
-
Centralized and decentralized contracts in a moral hazard environment
Macho-Stadler, Inés, (1998)
-
Efficient allocations with hidden income and hidden storage
Cole, Harold L., (1998)
-
Efficient allocations with hidden income and hidden storage
Cole, Harold L., (1997)
- More ...
-
Why do public firms issue private and public securities?
Gomes, Armando R., (2005)
-
SEC regulation fair disclosure, information, and the cost of capital
Gomes, Armando R., (2004)
-
Mergers and acquisitions : an experimental analysis of synergies externalities and dynamics
Croson, Rachel Toni Algaze, (2006)
- More ...