Multitask principal-agent problems : optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation
Year of publication: |
2009
|
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Authors: | Bond, Philip ; Gomes, Armando R. |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 144.2009, 1, p. 175-211
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Nutzenfunktion | Utility function | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency | Theorie | Theory |
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