Multitasking, Competition and Provider Payment

Many important dimensions of quality health care are difficult to observe, monitor, and motivate. This paper examines how competition among providers interacts with payment system incentives when the allocation of provider effort among multiple such dimensions or ‘tasks’ is noncontractible. The framework highlights that an optimal provider payment system, including optimal risk adjustment, should take account of provider multitasking.

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Eggleston, Karen
Institutions:	Department of Economics, Tufts University
Subject:	payment incentives \| competition \| multitasking \| capitation \| managed care \| rationing \| risk adjustment

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 0101
Classification:	I10 - Health. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005070104