Mutually destructive bidding : the FCC auction design problem
Year of publication: |
2000
|
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Authors: | Bykowsky, Mark Mathew ; Cull, Robert J. ; Ledyard, John O. |
Published in: |
Journal of regulatory economics. - Norwell, Mass. [u.a.] : Springer, ISSN 0922-680X, ZDB-ID 1027173-9. - Vol. 17.2000, 3, p. 205-228
|
Subject: | Mobiltelefon | Mobile phone | Lizenz | Licence | Auktion | Auction | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Theorie | Theory | USA | United States |
Type of publication: | Article |
---|---|
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Notes: | FCC = Federal Communications Commission In: Journal of regulatory economics |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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