Myopic Investment Decisions and Competitive Labor Markets.
This paper analyzes an agency problem where managers are able to control an unobservable variable that affects the time distribution of returns on a firm's investments. Managers have an incentive to select myopic investments in order to convince the labor market that they have relatively high ability. The authors demonstrate that, if employment terms are determined in competitive labor markets and there are lower bounds on compensations, then, at the principal's second-best contract, managers make a myopic investment choice. They also characterize the structure of the principal's second-best contract and conduct comparative statics at this solution. Copyright 1994 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
Year of publication: |
1994
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Authors: | Campbell, Tim S ; Marino, Anthony M |
Published in: |
International Economic Review. - Department of Economics. - Vol. 35.1994, 4, p. 855-75
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Publisher: |
Department of Economics |
Saved in:
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