Myopic perception in repeated games
Year of publication: |
2020
|
---|---|
Authors: | Aramendia, Miguel ; Wen, Quan |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 119.2020, p. 1-14
|
Subject: | Folk theorem | Repeated game | Stochastic games | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Stochastisches Spiel | Stochastic game | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Folk-Theorem |
-
Limit equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games
Renault, Jérôme, (2020)
-
The robustness of incomplete penal codes in repeated interactions
Gossner, Olivier, (2020)
-
A folk theorem for stochastic games with private almost-perfect monitoring
Aiba, Katsuhiko, (2014)
- More ...
-
Forgiving-proof equilibrium in infinitely repeated games
Aramendia, Miguel, (2008)
-
Justifiable punishments in repeated games
Aramendia, Miguel, (2014)
-
Repeated Cournot model with justifiable punishments
Aramendia, Miguel, (2015)
- More ...