N-Person Sequential Bargaining with Endogenous Procedure.
Year of publication: |
1996
|
---|---|
Authors: | Vannetelbosch, V.J. |
Institutions: | Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain |
Subject: | BARGAINING | GAME THEORY | VOTING |
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