Nash Bargaining Solution is Implementable via Two-stage Rights Structures

Koray & Yildiz (2018) introduces a new framework for implementation in which the main tool to design is the rights structure introduced by Sertel (2001). It was assumed that there is only one stage to obtain the equilibrium outcome of a rights structure. We formulate implementation via two-stage rights structures and show that the Nash bargaining solution is implementable via two-stage rights structures

MoreLess

Year of publication:	[2021]
Authors:	Yildiz, Kemal
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Verhandlungstheorie \| Bargaining theory \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium

freely available

Full text |

More access options

doi.org

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (11 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 15, 2021 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.3832617 [DOI]
Classification:	D0 - Microeconomics. General ; C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods. General
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013230330