Nash equilibria in \infty-dimensional spaces: an approximation theorem
We show, by employing a density result for probability measures, that in games with a finite number of players and \infty-dimensional pure strategy spaces Nash equilibria can be approximated by finite mixed strategies. Given >0, each player receives an expected utility payoff /2 close to his Nash payoff and no player could change his strategy unilaterally and do better than .
Year of publication: |
1999-04-15
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Authors: | Muir, Allan ; Glycopantis, Dionysius |
Published in: |
Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 13.1999, 3, p. 743-751
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Publisher: |
Springer |
Subject: | Nash Equilibria \infty-dimensional strategy spaces | Finite number of players | Approximation theorem. |
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