Nash equilibria of network formation games under consent
We investigate the Nash equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation based on explicit consent in link formation. These so-called “consent models” explicitly take account of link formation costs. We provide characterizations of Nash equilibria of such consent models under both one-sided and two-sided costs of link formation. We relate these equilibrium concepts to link-based stability concepts, in particular strong link deletion proofness.
Year of publication: |
2012
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Authors: | Gilles, Robert P. ; Chakrabarti, Subhadip ; Sarangi, Sudipta |
Published in: |
Mathematical Social Sciences. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4896. - Vol. 64.2012, 2, p. 159-165
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Saved in:
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