Nash Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance

I formalise a rather stylised insurance market with adverse selection as a standard duopoly. I formally specify demand functions and profits and I prove that a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists if and only if the well-known Rothschild-Stiglitz allocation is efficient

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Year of publication:	2017
Authors:	Dosis, Anastasios
Publisher:	[2017]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Versicherung \| Insurance \| Adverse Selektion \| Adverse selection

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (9 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Economics Letters, Vol. 152, 2017 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 16, 2016 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2666967 [DOI]
Classification:	C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012970947