Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking down backward induction (extensively revised version)
We define Nash equilibrium for two-person normal form games in the presence of uncertainty, in the sense of Knight(1921). We use the fonna1iution of uncertainty due to Schmeidler and Gilboa. We show tbat there exist Nash equilibria for any degree of uncertainty, as measured by the uncertainty aversion (Dow anel Wer1ang(l992a». We show by example tbat prudent behaviour (maxmin) can be obtained as an outcome even when it is not rationaliuble in the usual sense. Next, we break down backward industion in the twice repeated prisoner's dilemma. We link these results with those on cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma obtained by Kreps-Milgrom-Roberts-Wdson(1982), and withthe 1iterature on epistemological conditions underlying Nash equilibrium. The knowledge notion implicit in this mode1 of equilibrium does not display logical omniscience.
Year of publication: |
1993-04
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Authors: | Dow, James ; Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa |
Institutions: | FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) |
Saved in:
freely available
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE). - ISSN 0104-8910. |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 213 |
Source: |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005009369
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