Nash Equilibrium When Players Account for the Complexity of their Forecasts.

Nash equilibrium is often interpreted as a steady state in which each player holds the correct expectations about the other players` behavior and acts rationally. This paper investigates the robustness of this interpretation when players` preferences are affected by their forecasts about the other players. In particular, I analyze the case of lexicographic preferences in which the simplicity of forecasts is secondary to material payoffs.

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Eliaz, K.
Institutions:	Foerder Institute for Economic Research, Eitan Berglas School of Economics
Subject:	GAMES \| FORECASTS \| EXPECTATIONS

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Series:	Tel Aviv.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	34 pages
Classification:	O21 - Planning Models; Planning Policy ; O22 - Project Analysis
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005489268