Nash implementation theory -- A note on full characterizations
The first full characterization of social choice correspondences that are implementable in Nash equilibrium, given in Moore and Repullo (1990), together with the working principle behind an algorithm to check this condition, given in Sjöström (1991), can be used to give a simple necessary and sufficient condition for implementation that is a generalization of monotonicity.
Year of publication: |
2010
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Authors: | Korpela, Ville |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 108.2010, 3, p. 283-285
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | (Maskin) Monotonicity Moore-Repullo-set Nash implementation No veto power |
Saved in:
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