Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awards
Year of publication: |
2006
|
---|---|
Authors: | Sanver, M. |
Published in: |
Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 28.2006, 2, p. 453-460
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Subject: | Maskin monotonicity | No veto power | Nash implementation | Mechanism design |
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