Nationalization as credible threat against collusion
Year of publication: |
March 2016
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Authors: | Delbono, Flavio ; Lambertini, Luca |
Published in: |
Journal of industry, competition and trade. - Dordrecht : Springer, ISSN 1566-1679, ZDB-ID 2067120-9. - Vol. 16.2016, 1, p. 127-136
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Subject: | Tacit collusion | Nationalization | Mixed oligopoly | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition | Oligopol | Oligopoly | Theorie | Theory | Kartell | Cartel | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games |
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