Negotiating the membership

In cooperative games in which the players are partitioned into groups, we study the incentives of the members of a group to leave it and become singletons. In this context, we model a non-cooperative mechanism in which each player has to decide whether to stay in his group or to exit and act as a singleton. We show that players, acting myopically, always reach a Nash equilibrium.

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Year of publication:	2004-09-01
Authors:	Vidal-Puga, Juan
Institutions:	EconWPA
Subject:	Cooperative game \| coalition structure \| Owen value \| Nash equilibrium

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Game Theory and Information.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Type of Document - pdf; pages: 20 . pdf, a4 papersize, prepared from Scientific WorkPlace, figures included 20 pages
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D8 - Information and Uncertainty
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118646