Network Economics and the Allocation of Savings : A Model of Peering in the Voice-over-IP Telecommunications Market

Online-Ressource (XV, 297p. 48 illus, digital)

Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ; 653

Includes bibliographical references (p. 291-297)

Network Economics and the Allocation of Savings; Preface; Contents; List of Figures; List of Tables; Chapter 1: Motivation and Nontechnical Overview; Part I: Selected Theoretical Concepts; Chapter 2: The Theory of Games; 2.1 On Game Theory; 2.2 Noncooperative Games; 2.2.1 Overview; 2.2.2 Strategic Form Games; 2.2.3 Extensive Form Games; 2.3 Cooperative Games; 2.3.1 Overview; 2.3.2 The Cooperative Game; 2.3.3 Important Classes and Types of Games; 2.3.3.1 Strategic Equivalence; 2.3.3.2 The (0,1)-Normalization; 2.3.3.3 Constant-Sum and Zero-Sum Games

2.3.3.4 Rational, Essential, and Inessential Games2.3.3.5 Dummy Players; 2.3.3.6 Carriers; 2.3.3.7 Unanimity Games; 2.3.3.8 Partnerships; 2.3.4 Properties of a Game; 2.3.4.1 Symmetry; 2.3.4.2 k-Games; 2.3.4.3 Supermodularity and Convexity; 2.3.4.4 How Supermodularity Implies Convexity and Vice Versa; 2.3.4.5 Superadditivity; 2.3.4.6 Monotonicity; 2.3.4.7 Decomposability; 2.3.5 Dual Games and the Tennessee Valley Authority; 2.3.5.1 Duality Applied: The Tennessee Valley Authority; 2.3.5.2 Relationship; 2.4 Solutions Concepts for Cooperative Games; 2.4.1 Overview

2.4.2 Stable Sets: The von Neumann Morgenstern Solution2.4.3 The Core; 2.4.3.1 Overview; 2.4.3.2 Definition and Characterization of the Core; 2.4.3.3 The Existence of the Core; 2.4.3.4 Core Existence in 3-player Games; 2.4.3.5 Core Existence in n-player Games; 2.4.3.6 A Necessary Condition for General Games; 2.4.3.7 The Bondareva-Shapley Theorem; 2.4.3.8 The Core in Convex Games; 2.4.3.9 Stable Sets and the Core; 2.4.3.10 The Least-Core; 2.4.4 Allocation Rules as Point-valued Solutions; 2.4.5 The Shapley Value; 2.4.6 The Weighted Shapley Value; 2.4.7 Bargaining Solutions

2.4.7.1 The Bargaining Problem2.4.7.2 The Nash Solution for Bargaining Problems; 2.4.7.3 The Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution for Bargaining Problems; Chapter 3: Network Theory in Economics; 3.1 Overview; 3.2 Basic Concepts and Definitions; 3.3 Communication Situations; 3.4 Allocation Rules in Communication Situations; 3.5 The Myerson Value; 3.6 Network Formation; 3.6.1 Overview; 3.6.2 Network Formation in Extensive Form; 3.6.3 Network Formation in Strategic Form; 3.6.4 On the Stability of Networks; Part II: Applications to Peering in Telecommunications

Chapter 4: Telecommunications and the Internet4.1 Overview; 4.2 A Brief Refresher on Telecommunications Networks; 4.2.1 Architecture of a Classic PSTN; 4.2.2 The Internet; 4.2.3 Overlap and Convergence to Next Generation Networks; 4.3 Market Liberalization and Regulation; 4.4 Telephony on IP-Based Networks; 4.4.1 IP Telephony; 4.4.2 Classes of VoIP Firms; 4.4.3 The Re-Routing Problem; 4.5 Related Research; Chapter 5: A Model of Peering Among VoIP Firms; 5.1 Overview; 5.2 The VoIP Peering Game; 5.2.1 Basic Setup and Assumptions; 5.2.2 The Characteristic Function of the Game

5.2.3 The Peering Game and Its Properties

10.1007/978-3-642-21096-9 [DOI]

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