Network-Induced Agency Conflicts in Delegated Portfolio Management
Year of publication: |
[2021]
|
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Authors: | Gao, Xinzi ; Wong, T.J ; Xia, Lijun ; Yu, Gwen |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory | Portfolio-Management | Portfolio selection |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (56 p) |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | In: The Accounting Review, (2021) 96 (1): 171–198 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments January 10, 2020 erstellt |
Classification: | G10 - General Financial Markets. General ; G11 - Portfolio Choice ; G14 - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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