New axioms for immediate acceptance
Year of publication: |
December 2016
|
---|---|
Authors: | Chen, Yajing |
Published in: |
Review of economic design : RED. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1434-4742, ZDB-ID 1409550-6. - Vol. 20.2016, 4, p. 329-337
|
Subject: | Immediate acceptance algorithm | Favoring higher ranks | Characterization | Theorie | Theory | Innovationsakzeptanz | Innovation adoption | Ranking-Verfahren | Ranking method |
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