New Directions in Experimental Coordiantion Games
Recent experimental results show that equilibrium selection in coordination games exhibits remarkable regularities. We analyze three important determinants for equilibrium selection in coordination games, the size of the population of players, the number of periods during which players interact and the local interaction structure imposed on the population of players.
Year of publication: |
1998
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Authors: | Berninghaus, Siegfried K. ; Erhart, Karl-Martin ; Keser, Claudia |
Published in: |
Homo Oeconomicus. - Institute of SocioEconomics. - Vol. 15.1998, p. 93-106
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Publisher: |
Institute of SocioEconomics |
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