New Evidence on the Market for Directors: Board Membership and Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310
We examine the relation between a board's decision to reject antitakeover provisions of Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310 and subsequent labor market opportunities of those same board members. Compared to directors retaining all provisions, directors rejecting all protective provisions of SB1310 are three times as likely to gain additional external directorships and are 30 percent more likely to retain their internal slot on the board of that same Pennsylvania company. For external board seats, the results are driven by nonexecutive directors who are not members of the management team; for internal board seats, the results are driven by executive directors. Copyright 2003 by the American Finance Association.
Year of publication: |
2003
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Authors: | Coles, Jeffrey L. ; Hoi, Chun-Keung |
Published in: |
Journal of Finance. - American Finance Association - AFA, ISSN 1540-6261. - Vol. 58.2003, 1, p. 197-230
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Publisher: |
American Finance Association - AFA |
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