Twenty-one papers explore the accomplishments, limitations, and unmet needs of the field of new institutional economics. Papers discuss the theories of the firm; contracts--from bilateral sets of incentives to the multilevel governance of relations; institutions and the institutional environment; human nature and institutional analysis; the "case" for case studies in new institutional economics; new institutional econometrics--the case of research on contracting and organization; experimental methodology to inform new institutional economics issues; game theory and institutions; new institutional economics, organization, and strategy; interfirm alliances--a new institutional economics approach; governance structure and contractual design in retail chains; make-or-buy decisions--a new institutional economics approach; transaction costs, property rights, and the tools of the new institutional economics--water rights and water markets; contracting and organization in food and agriculture; buying, lobbying, or suing--interest groups' participation in policy making--a selective survey; regulation and deregulation in network industry; constitutional political economy--analyzing formal institutions at the most elementary level; new institutional economics and its application on transition and developing economies; law and economics in retrospect; the theory of the firm and its critics--a stocktaking and assessment; and the causes of institutional inefficiency--a development perspective. Brousseau is Professor of Economics at the University of Paris X and Director of EconomiX. Glachant is Professor of Economics and Head of the Electricity Reforms Group in the ADIS Research Center at the University of Paris-Sud XI. Index.
