New vs. reelected mayor: who is more responsive to disasters?

by Mel Lorenzo Accad

Are new mayors more responsive to disasters than their reelected counterparts? The identification strategy is based on slim vote margin in which new and reelected mayors are found to be as if randomly assigned. We find that with greater storm exposure: new mayors spend more on health sector than reelected mayors. We don't find stable and statistically significant result in other sectors and in total municipal income or expenditure

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Year of publication:	[2020] ; Version: March 25, 2020
Authors:	Accad, Mel Lorenzo
Publisher:	[Diliman, Quezon City] : UP School of Economics, University of the Philippines
Subject:	election \| accountability \| disaster response \| Katastrophe \| Disaster \| Humanitäre Hilfe \| Humanitarian aid \| Wahl \| Election \| Wahlverhalten \| Voting behaviour \| Katastrophenschutz \| Emergency management

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 26 Seiten) Illustrationen
Series:	Discussion paper / University of the Philippines, School of Economics. - Quezon : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2190310-4. - Vol. no. 2020, 03 (March 2020)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/243057 [Handle]
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; h84 ; O17 - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012195109