No-Show Paradoxes under Parliamentary Agendas

It may happen that the favorite candidate of a voter loses an election if that voter votes honestly, but gets elected if the voter abstains. Such a situation is known in the social choice literature under the name of « no-show paradox ». This paper is devoted to the evaluation of the likelihood of that phenomenon under parliamentary voting rules.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	MBIH, Boniface ; ZHAO, Xingyu
Published in:	Annales d'Economie et de Statistique. - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Admnistration Économique (ENSAE). - 2011, 101-102, p. 127-148
Publisher:	École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Admnistration Économique (ENSAE)

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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