I lump neuroethicists into three loose categories distinguishable to some degree by broad divisions in academia. The first category [medicine] consists of medical doctors (e.g., Joseph Fins, MD). The second category [science] consists of scientists trained in the life and quantitative social sciences (e.g., Michael Gazzaniga, PhD). The third category [philosophy] consists of neuroethicists trained in the humanities, especially philosophy (e.g., Jonathan Moreno, PhD). Obviously, there are many interdisciplinary neuroethicists, but the foregoing categorization is apt on moral and, to a certain degree, methodological grounds. Medical doctors are formally bound by “medical ethics” because their primary commitment is clinical, to heal the sick. Life scientists, my second category, interact with and experiment on humans, but are not bound by medical ethics. Rather, their commitment is to “the science.” This is a significantly different moral commitment. The third category of neuroethicists are observers who do not treat people or experiment on them. Generally, each category will approach neuroethics differently because of disciplinary training, culture and commitments. Joseph Fins makes an eloquent and historically informed argument that the profession of medicine, exemplified by the eminent medical doctor Wilder Penfield, provides solid, pragmatic standards for the entire range of neuroethics as practiced by all neuroethicists. He argues that neuroethicists who are “ethicists and philosophers” would be more helpful to the needs of the clinic if they limited their statements about the potential uses and risks of neuroscience to the language of scientific hypotheses that can be falsified. The pragmatic values of medicine (good for the patient) and science (falsifiable hypotheses) should have priority over philosophical values with regard to neuroscience.Based on the taxonomy of neuroethicists I argue Fins' naturalism undermines political order, effectively politicizing the clinic
