Noisy Signaling in Monopoly

We study the informational role of prices in a stochastic environment. We provide a closed-form solution of the monopoly problem when the price imperfectly signals quality to the uninformed buyers. We then study the effect of noise on output, market price, information flows, and expected profits. The presence of noise may reduce the informational externality due to asymmetric information, which increases the firm's expected profits

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Salgueiro, Egas M.
Other Persons:	Mirman, Leonard J. (contributor) ; Santugini, Marc (contributor)
Publisher:	[2013]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Monopol \| Monopoly \| Signalling
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: International Review of Economics & Finance, Vol. 29, 2014, Forthcoming Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 9, 2013 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	D21 - Firm Behavior ; D42 - Monopoly ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; D84 - Expectations; Speculations ; L12 - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies ; L15 - Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013071968