Non-aviation revenues and their implications for airport regulation
This paper analyzes a non-congested private airport that possesses market power in providing aeronautical services. We find that the profit-maximizing landing fee decreases in the degree of complementarity of aviation and non-aviation. Furthermore, our model implies that airports will not take advantage of their market power if non-aviation revenues, or the degree of complementarity of aviation and non-aviation, exceed a critical threshold. In this case, a dual-till regulation will be unnecessary. A single-till regulation, on the other hand, will always result in lower landing fees than laissez-faire.
Year of publication: |
2011
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kratzsch, Uwe ; Sieg, Gernot |
Published in: |
Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review. - Elsevier, ISSN 1366-5545. - Vol. 47.2011, 5, p. 755-763
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Airport pricing Airport regulation Dual-till Landing fee Non-aviation revenue Single-till |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
An international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases
Kratzsch, Uwe, (2011)
-
When to regulate airports: A simple rule
Kratzsch, Uwe, (2009)
-
A full participation agreement on global emission reduction through strategic investments in R&D
Kratzsch, Uwe, (2010)
- More ...