Non-convexities and the gains from concealing defenses from committed terrorists
How should countries defend against committed terrorists who attack until defeated? We identify a fundamental non-convexity--one only needs to defeat the terrorist once. Consequently, provided a country values targets similarly, it should conceal defenses and allocate defense resources randomly.
Year of publication: |
2010
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bernhardt, Dan ; Polborn, Mattias K. |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 107.2010, 1, p. 52-54
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Hidden defenses Resource allocation Security Randomization Terrorism |
Saved in:
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