Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets

In this study we present a simple mechanism in a many-to-one matching market where multiple costless applications are allowed. The mechanism is based on the principles of eligibility and priority and it implements the set of stable matchings in Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. We extend the analysis to a symmetric mechanism where colleges and students interchange their roles. This mechanism also implements the set of stable matchings.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Romero-Medina, Antonio ; Triossi, Matteo
Published in:	Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 87.2014, C, p. 624-630
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Sequential mechanisms \| Stable outcomes \| Multiple applications \| Irreversibility

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931188