Non-self-averaging of a two-person game with only positive spillover : a new formulation of Avatamsaka's dilemma
Year of publication: |
2009
|
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Authors: | Aruka, Yūji ; Akiyama, Eizo |
Published in: |
Journal of economic interaction and coordination : JEIC. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1860-711X, ZDB-ID 2239073-X. - Vol. 4.2009, 2, p. 135-161
|
Subject: | Evolutionäre Spieltheorie | Evolutionary game theory |
Extent: | Ill., graph. Darst. |
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Type of publication: | Article |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Erratum enth. in Bd.: 5.2010, 1, S. 109 |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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